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Executive Summary
The current Social Security system is unsustainable.  
As President Clinton has pointed out, the only alternative 
to tax increases or benefit cuts is to increase the rate of
return to investment of Social Security funds.  That means
either allowing individuals to invest their own Social
Security taxes or allowing the government to invest them.
Supporters of government investing claim that it would allow
the government to reap the benefits of the higher returns
available in private capital markets, incur lower adminis-
trative costs than individual accounts, and allow the gov-
ernment to spread the risk of poor investment performance.  
On the surface, that approach may have some appeal; in
reality it is fraught with peril.  It could potentially make
the federal government the largest shareholder in American
corporations, raising the possibility of government control 
of American business.  In addition, there are serious ques-
tions about what types of investment the government would
make.  Political considerations and "social investing" are
likely to influence the government's investment decisions,
allowing the government to manipulate economic markets. 
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Introduction
Speaking at a 1998 national forum on Social Secu rity
reform in Albuquerque, President Clinton suggested that the
only way out of Social Security’s looming financial crisis
without devastating tax hikes or benefit cuts is to “take
advantage of the higher return on investment” in private
capital markets. 1  The president's remarks reflected a
growing consensus that private investment is the key to any
future Social Security reform.  But what kind of private
investment?  And who should do the investing?  Those ques-
tions will be at the heart of the upcoming debate over
Social Security's future. 2
On one side of the debate are those calling for indi-
vidually owned, privately managed accounts that allow indi-
vidual workers to divert their Social Security taxes into
accounts similar to individual retirement accounts or 401(k)
retirement plans.  Workers would own their accounts and--
with in defined limits--control their investment choices. 
This would be a "defined-contribution" plan, under which
workers' accumulated retirement benefits would depend on the
amount of workers' contributions plus the return they earned
on individual investments.
Others have proposed a continuation of the current
Social Security system's "defined-benefit" approach: setting
workers' retirement benefits by law without relation to
individual contributions or investment.  Under such a plan,
however, a portion of the current Social Security surplus
would be invested in private capital markets by the govern-
ment itself, bringing a higher rate of return to the system
as a whole.
Superficially, that approach offers s ome attraction.  
It promises the advantages of higher returns through private
capital investment, while spreading individual risk and
minimizing administrative costs.  In reality, allowing the
government to control such an enormous amount of private
investment, in the words of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
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Greenspan, "has very far reaching poten tial dangers for a
free American economy and a free American society." 3
The Current System
Social Security is currently running a surplus.  In
1996, for example, Social Security taxes--both payroll taxes
and income taxes on benefits--amounted to $385.7 billion. 
Benefit payments and administrative expenses totaled only
$353.6 billion, resulting in a surplus of $70.8 billion. 4
Under current law, that money must be invested solely in
U.S. government securities.  The securities can be any of
three types: government securities purchased on the open
market; securities bought at issue, as part of a new offer-
ing to the public; or special-issue securities, not traded
publicly.  In actual practice, virtually all the securities
purchased have been special-issue securities, 5 which earn an
interest rate equal to the average market rate yield on all
U.S. government securities with at least four years
remaining until maturity, rounded to the nearest one-eighth
percent--an average of approximately 2.3 percent above
infla tion.
By contrast, equities have earned an average 7.56 
percent real rate of return over the past 60 years.  Some
have suggested that the government should be allowed to
invest a portion of the Social Security surplus in equities
rather than government securities, allowing the Social
Security system to reap the benefits of the higher rate of
return. 6
Proposals for Government Investing
The idea of allowing the government to invest excess
Social Security funds in private capital markets is not a
new one.  As early as the 1930s, fiscal conservatives warned
that unless private securities were included in the govern-
ment's portfolio, the trust fund would earn less than market
returns.  But they also realized that if the government
invested in private securities, it would lead to large-scale
government ownership of capital and interference in American
business.  Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.) warned that "it
is scarcely conceivable that rational men should propose
such an unmanageable accumulation of funds in one place in a
democracy." 7  In the end, Congress rejected not only gov-
ernment investing but any system of full funding, establish-
ing a pay-as-you-go program in which nearly all the taxes
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paid by current workers are not saved or invested in any way
but used to pay benefits to current retirees.
Two factors brought the concept of government investing
back into public debate.  First, following a series of
Social Security reforms in 1983, the Social Security system
began to run a modest surplus.  Second, demographic trends
made it clear that the program’s pay-as-you-go structure was
not sustainable.
Proposals for government investment first appeared in
legislation in the early 1990s.  The idea received wide-
spread public attention when 6 of the 13 members of the
1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security recommended the
invest ment of up to 40 percent of the Social Security Trust
Fund in private capital markets. 8  As Robert Ball, author of
the proposal, put it, "Why should the trust fund earn one
third as much as common stocks?" 9
Proposals for government investment have now been
endorsed by a handful of economists, including Henry Aaron
of the Brookings Institution and Peter Diamond of the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology.  Government investing is
reportedly the centerpiece of Social Security reform legis-
lation being developed by Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-N.D.). 
Proponents of government investing claim that it would allow
the government to reap the benefits of the higher returns
available in private capital markets but would incur lower
administrative costs than individual accounts and would
allow the government to spread the risk of poor investment
performance. 
On the surface that approach may have some appeal ; in
reality it is fraught with peril.
Corporate Governance
Allowing the government to invest directly in private
capital markets raises serious questions of ownership and
control.  At its peak, the Social Security Trust Fund will
contain approximately $2.9 trillion.  The total value of all
2, 723 stocks currently traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change is about $12.8 trillion.  It is obvious that allowing
the federal government to purchase stocks would give it the
ability to obtain a significant, if not a controlling, share
of virtually every major company in America.  Experience has
shown that even a 2 or 3 percent block of shares can give an
activist shareholder substantial influence over the policies
of publicly traded companies. 10
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The result could be a government bureaucrat sitting on
every corporate board, a prospect that has divided advocates
of government investing.  Some have claimed that the gov-
ernment would be a "passive" investor--that is, it would
refuse to vote its shares or take positions on issues af-
fecting corporate operations.  Others, such as the AFL-CIO's
Gerald Shea, have suggested that the government should
exercise its new influence over the American economy, claim-
ing that government involvement would "have a good effect on
how corporate America operates." 11
The experience of state employee pension funds suggests
that governments may not be able to resist the temptation to
meddle in corporate affairs.  For example, in the late
1980s, state employee pension plans in California and New
York actively attempted to influence the election of a new
board chairman for General Motors. 12  According to a report
by the U.S. House of Representatives, state employee pension
plans are increasingly using their clout to influence "the
corporate role in environmental improvement, humanitarian
problems, and economic development." 13
Supporters of government investment claim that the
government would remain a passive investor, refusing to vote
its shares.  However, that would require an extraordinary
degree of restraint by future presidents and congresses. 
Imagine the pressure faced by a congress if the government
were to own a significant interest in a company that was
threatening to close its plants and move them overseas at
the cost of thousands of jobs.  Could politicians really
remain passive in the face of such political pressure?
Even if the government remained passive, its very
ownership of large blocks of stock would, in effect, create
a situation favoring certain stockholders and corporate
managers.  As the General Accounting Office has pointed out,
if the government did not exercise its voting rights, other
stockholders would find their own voting power enhanced and
could take advantage of government passivity. 14
The GAO also warns that regardless of what stock voting
rules are adopted when the program begins, Congress can
always change the rules in the future. 15
Social Investing
Even if the government avoids directly using  its equity
ownership to influ ence corporate governance, there is likely
to be an enormous temptation to allow political consider-
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ations to influence the type of investments that the govern-
ment makes.  In short, should the government invest solely
to earn the highest possible return on investments, or
should the government consider larger political and societal
questions?
The theory behind social investing was perhaps best
explained in a 1989 report by a task force established by
then Governor Mario Cuomo to consider how New York public
employee pension funds were being invested.  The task force
concluded that state employee pension funds should not be
operated solely for the benefit of state employees and
retirees.  In the opinion of the task force, those employees
and retirees were only one among several groups of "stake-
holders" in state employee pension programs, others being
"the plan sponsor; corporations seeking investment capital
from the pension fund; taxpayers who support the compensa-
tion of public employees, including contributions to the
pension fund; and the public, whose well being may be af-
fected by the investment choice of fund managers " (emphasis
added). 16  Using that criterion, the task force rejected the
idea that investments should be made solely on the basis of
maximizing the immediate return to the pension trust. 
Instead, pensions should be invested in a way that maximizes
"both direct and indirect returns" to all stakeholders,
including "the larger society and economy."  Therefore, the
task force concluded, state employee pension funds should be
guided into economic development projects beneficial to the
state of New York.
Most state employee pension funds are subject to such
social investing. Alaska may have been the first state to
require social investing, with a requirement in the early
1970s that a portion of state pension funds be used to
finance home mortgages in the state. 17  The Alaska example
also illustrates the dangers of social investing.  A down-
turn in the local real estate market cost the fund millions
of dollars that had to be made up through other revenue
sources. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, social investment in-
creasingly came to be a part of state pension programs. 18 
It became a subject of widespread public debate in the mid-
1980s with the question of South African divestment.  Even-
tually, 30 states prohibited the investment of pension funds
in companies that did business in South Africa.  Today,
approximately 42 percent of state, county, and municipal
pension systems have restrictions targeting some portion of
investment to projects designed to stimulate the local
economy or create jobs.  This includes investment in local
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infrastructure and public works projects as well as invest-
ment in in-state businesses and local real estate develop-
ment.19  In addition, 23 percent of the pension systems have
prohibitions against investment in specific types of compa-
nies, including restrictions on investment in companies that
fail to meet the "MacBride Principles" for doing busi ness in
Northern Ireland, companies doing business in Libya and
other Arab countries; companies that are accused of pollu-
tion, unfair labor practices, or failing to meet equal
opportunity guidelines; the alcohol, tobacco, and defense
industries; and even companies that market infant formula to
Third World countries. 20
A nearly infinite list of current political controver-
sies would be ripe for such restrictions if the federal
government began investing Social Security funds.  Both
liberals and conservatives would have their own investment
agendas.  Should Social Security invest in nonunion compa-
nies?  Companies that make nuclear weapons?  Companies that
pay high corporate salaries or do not offer health benefits?
 Companies that do business in Burma or Cuba?  Companies
that extend benefits to the partners of gay employees? 
Companies that pollute?  Companies that donate to Planned
Parenthood? Investment in companies ranging from Microsoft
to Nike, from Texaco to Walt Disney, would be sure to
engender controver sy.
Supporters of government investment suggest two ways to
avoid the problem of social investing.  First, they propose
the creation of an independent board to manage the system's
investment, a board that would operate free of any political
interference.  However, Alan Greenspan, who should be in a
position to know about board independence, has said that he
believes it would be impossible to insulate such a board
from politics.  Testifying before Congress on proposals for
government investment, Greenspan warned:
I don't know of any way that you can essentially
insulate government decisionmakers from having
access to what will amount to very large invest-
ments in American private industry. . . . I know
there are those who believe it can be insulated
from the political process, they go a long way to
try to do that.  I have been around long enough to
realize that that is just not credible and not
possible.  Somewhere along the line, that breach
will be broken. 21
 
Indeed, the difficulty of shielding investment deci-
sions from political considerations was illustrated, unin-
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tention ally, by one of the supporters of government invest-
ment, Jonathan Cohn, writing in the New Republic .  "It would
be easy to prohibit manipulation of the market for political
reasons," Cohn wrote.  "All you would have to do is assign
responsibility for the investments to a quasi-independent
body, then carefully limit how it can make investment deci-
sions." 22  In other words, the new agency would be indepen-
dent except that Congress would set restrictions on its
investment decisions.
Supporters of government investment suggest  a second
means of avoiding social investment: the investment would be
made only in index funds, eliminating the choice of individ-
ual stocks.  However, that does not eliminate social invest-
ment questions, since there would remain the issue of what
stocks should be included in the index, whether an existing
index or a new one created just for Social Security. 
The Federal Thrift Savings Program: An Imperfect Analogy
Supporters of government investing often cite the
federal thrift savings program as an example to show that
government pension funds can avoid politicization.  It is
true that, so far, the TSP has avoided social investment and
interference with corporate governance.  However, there are
several important differences between the TSP and a govern-
ment-invested Social Security program. 
Perhaps most important, the TSP is a defined-contri-
bution program with individually owned accounts.  Workers do
have a property right in their account, which is not true of
Social Security.  In the case of Fleming v. Nestor  (1960),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that individuals have no proper-
ty right in Social Security.  Allowing the government to
invest a portion of Social Security revenues in capital
markets would do nothing to alter that.
Therefore, a gov ernment-invested Social Security pro-
gram would be far more akin to defined-benefit state employ-
ee pension plans.  A 1990 congressional report concluded
that while workers acquire an interest in pension funds once
they are vested, they have no legal ownership rights.  The
report went on to note that it would be equally incorrect to
say that government "owned" the funds because the govern-
ment's discretion in spending or disposing of the funds is
limited under state trust law and the Internal Revenue
Code. 23  The report concludes that there is no exclusive
ownership by either party, 24 and that ownership, in any
case, may be unimportant because "public defined benefit
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pensions are entitlements granted by governments that can be
modified or taken away." 25 
Because workers have no ownership right to their pen-
sion funds, the government has no fiduciary duty to the
workers.  The situation may be even worse for a government-
invested Social Security system.  For all the social invest-
ment practices discussed above, state employee pension funds
have been somewhat restrained by the "exclusive benefit
rule," an Internal Revenue Service ruling that requires tax-
exempt trusts to operate solely for the benefit of the
trustees. 26  The applicability of that rule to government
pension funds is extremely limited, however, since the tax
exemption status of the trust is irrelevant.  The employ er--
being the government--is already tax exempt.  Therefore, the
only potential enforcement mechanism is for the IRS to
disqualify the plan, meaning that workers would be taxed on
the employer's contribution.  Because such a penalty would
fall on innocent third parties, the threat is seldom in-
voked.  It is even more unlikely to be invoked in the case
of a government-invested Social Security system.  It would
certainly be unfair to do so--to impose a huge new tax on
every American worker because the government mismanages the
investment of its funds.  Of course, that assumes an IRS
independent enough to take action against the federal gov-
ernment's own investment decisions.  As a result, unlike the
TSP, there appears to be no legal barrier to social invest-
ing under a government-invested Social Security program.
Second, as a defined-contribution program, the TSP is
transparent. Benefits are dependent on the return to their
investment, not on an arbitrary benefit formula.  Therefore,
the workers have a direct interest in ensuring that invest-
ments are made solely to maximize their returns.  Workers
can see exactly how an investment decision impacts their
retirement benefits.  Under a government-invested Social
Security program, benefits would be defined by law and would
be only indirectly affected by individual investment deci-
sions.  Therefore, workers would have little incentive to
resist social investing.  They would have no direct interest
in whether investments are made solely to maximize returns
or for other purposes.
Finally, the TSP is a voluntary program.  If workers
are dissatisfied with investment practices under the pro-
gram, they can refuse to participate.  Therefore, fund
managers have an incentive to maximize returns.  Failure to
do so will result in a loss of business.  In contrast, a
government-invested Social Security system would be mandato-
ry.  Workers would be forced to continue contributing 12.4
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percent of their income to the system, no matter how dissat-
isfied they were. 
Clearly, then, there are both legal and market re-
straints on the TSP that would not exist under a government-
invested Social Security system.  Indeed, the TSP model
would seem to argue for exactly the opposite, a system of
individually owned, privately invested accounts.  Only such
a system would replicate the TSP's safeguards--property
rights, a fiduciary responsibility, transparency, and an
ability to remove funds from a nonperforming investor.
Conclusion
The only way to reform Social Security without raising
taxes or cutting benefits is to change the program from pay-
as-you-go financing to a system based on saving and invest-
ment in real capital assets.  However, allowing the govern-
ment to do the investing would raise serious questions of
corporate governance and social investing, potentially
threatening the American economy.  It would be far better to
allow individual workers to invest for their own retirement.
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